A cooperate-defect model for the spread of deviant behavior in social
  networks by Rajtmajer, Sarah et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
8.
27
70
v2
  [
cs
.G
T]
  1
6 A
ug
 20
14
A cooperate-defect model for the spread of
deviant behavior in social networks
Sarah Rajtmajer∗, Christopher Griffin∗†, Derek Mikesell†, Anna Squicciarini+
Department of Mathematics∗, College of Information Sciences and Technology+
Applied Research Laboratory†
The Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA, USA
Abstract—We present a game-theoretic model for
the spread of deviant behavior in online social net-
works. We utilize a two-strategy framework wherein
each player’s behavior is classified as normal or
deviant and evolves according to the cooperate-defect
payoff scheme of the classic prisoner’s dilemma game.
We demonstrate convergence of individual behavior
over time to a final strategy vector and indicate coun-
terexamples to this convergence outside the context of
prisoner’s dilemma. Theoretical results are validated
on a real-world dataset collected from a popular
online forum.
I. INTRODUCTION
Commenting systems on the Social Web have
grown in popularity over the past few years, from
blogs and social media sites like YouTube and
Flickr to major news sites like NYTimes.com.
Following this trend, episodes of abuse online
are proliferating [4], [7], [19], [22]. Generally, any
behavior that is ”antisocial”, destructive, negative
and offensive is considered as abusive, although
abusive behavior comes in many forms ranging
from minor to extremely harmful. Some of such
forms include grieving, trolling, flaming, harass-
ment, threats trolling, multiple accounts, shared
accounts, advertising, plagiarism etc.
Users’ reactions to antisocial peers may range
drastically, based on their personality traits, predis-
position toward certain behaviors, level of influence,
and other contextual factors. Users may choose to
engage in the discussion by mimicking the antiso-
cial peer, confronting him and possibly reporting
the behavior to superusers, simply ignoring the
negative influence, or even leaving the network.
Over time, many popular real-world communities
such as Reddit [23] have suffered damaging effects
resulting from those few participants that choose to
behave in a manner that is counter to established
norms of behavior.
To date, despite a significant amount of work
on the detection of social spammers, deception
[3], collective attention spam [12], [18], [19], [25],
[28] and online vandalism, the dynamics underlying
online abusive behavior remain uncertain [26].
Toward developing a better understanding of
this phenomenon, in this paper, we aim to build
mathematical models to investigate the patterns of
persuasion in online social networks, with emphasis
on antisocial behavior. We design an evolutionary
game over a social network graph to describe how
users interact with, influence and are influenced by
both cooperative and antisocial behavior. During
the game, members of the community may behave
cooperatively, i.e. participating constructively in the
network, or defectively, i.e. antisocial behavior.
Each pairwise interaction between users yields a
distinct payoff to each user, according to the extent
of cooperation or defection exhibited by both in that
interaction. At each iteration of game, every user
observes his own total payoff as well as the actions
and payoffs of his peers. We allow users to change
their behavior accordingly, and we posit that this
change in behavior will generally serve to mimic
peers with observed higher payoff.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
effort investigating this class of models to explain
the spread of online abusive behavior.
We validate some of our findings on a real-world
dataset collected from the web. Precisely, we model
the interactions amongst users who are part of a
threaded online community and discuss topics of
interest with other peers. Each user post is assessed
and labelled on a scale from most cooperative to
most deviant. The trajectories of these scores are
then tracked within the context of the social network
graph and compared against expected values of our
theoretical evolutionary game.
Following we present a summary of relevant,
related work in the literature, as it compares to our
present study. We outline formally the problem we
study and the game theoretic framework we have
established, and prove some important theoretical
properties of this game for both the special class of
complete graphs and in the general case. Finally, we
compare our expectations with measured deviance
on a real-world online dataset.
II. RELATED WORK
Our work relates to the body of work on online
deviance as it has been investigated by the computer
science and by mathematical modeling approaches.
Several recent works focus on detecting social
spammers [12], [17]–[19], [25], [28]. Social spam-
mers, according to this body of work, are users
controlled either by humans or bots, who use social
networking sites and in particular their social con-
nections to promote products, advertise events, or
simply post useless and/or inappropriate comments.
Lee et al. [19] studied social spammers in online
social networks. To do so, they deployed social
honeypots for harvesting deceptive spam profiles
from social networking communities, and created
spam classifiers using machine learning methods
(e.g., SVM) based on a variety of features. Simi-
larly, Kantchelian [18] developed an approach for
detecting comment spam by leveraging the informa-
tiveness level of a comment; he showed that spam-
mers’ comments have low information levels. Hu et
al. [12] also proposed a comprehensive framework
for social spam detection, based on social network
content, attaining a high accuracy of detection. Our
focus is not on social spammers only but rather
on activities related to vandalism and misbehavior,
which may or may not be generated by social
spammers.
To deal with vandalism and bots, several tools
exist (e.g. [2], [24]). Automated bots (e.g., Cluebot),
filters (e.g., abusefilter), and editing assistants (e.g.,
Huggle and Twinkle) all aim to locate acts of
vandalism. Such tools work via regular expressions
and manually-authored rule sets. Though useful,
these systems are unable to explain or predict where
instances of abusive and deviant behaviors will
occur, and are often limited to language detection.
Finally, our work parallels the body of work
on free-riding in peer-to-peer systems [6], [29].
Peer-to-peer systems are designed to allow users to
connect with others and share resources. Similar to
online communities, users are free to access and
contribute as much as desired, and few controls
are in place. As a result, in p2p systems peers
may abuse their connections by exploiting other
peers’ resources, refusing to share owned resources,
sharing broken or corrupted resources, etc., drain-
ing the network without contributing it. In online
communities, the health of the community is heav-
ily based on individual peers’ reactions to selfish
behavior, which they may choose to emulate or
disengage from. Punishment mechanisms can also
be put in place, although these are often considered
not to be truly effective. To tackle these issues,
the most common solution is the implementation of
incentive-based mechanisms. Incentives are applied
in certain online forums, whereby end users are
given special roles and privileges as a reward for
good behavior.
From a theoretical perspective, our work can be
placed in the context of the DeGroot model [5] in
which an individual changes her opinion dynami-
cally and in part through imitation. In that model,
a discrete time Markov chain forms the underlying
behavior. From a game theoretic perspective, Morris
[21] studies behavioral contagion in coordination
games. Our work in this paper considers Prisoner’s
dilemma, but our main result (Proposition 5.1) is
applicable to a broader class of games. In addition
to this, our work is inspired by work by the work
of Jackson et al. [13]–[16] when we consider the
proposed model on the presence of network changes
[8].
In this work, we propose a model for the spread
of deviance in online social networks. We do not
propose mechanisms for punishment and reward of
deviant behavior, but instead we model the inherent
gain or loss for a user in the network who exhibits
antisocial, deviant behavior, and accordingly, how
this behavior as well as perceived gain or loss
resulting from this behavior, effects the strategies
of other users in the system over time.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a network of users represented as a
graph, wherein users are represented as nodes in the
system and edges may represent stated friendships,
recorded interactions or generally any indication
that those two users have some influence on one
another. Each player is assigned an initial probabil-
ity of choosing to cooperate during each interaction
which we refer to as the player’s initial strategy.
In an online SN, the initial strategy represents
individual predisposition for cooperation, separate
from the effects of peer influence. 1
From this initial set of strategies, we introduce
an evolutionary game wherein pairwise interactions
amongst users yield a distinct payoff to each player,
according to some payoff matrix. A player’s total
payoff at each iteration is given as the sum of
his payoffs over all of his pairwise interactions.
In our study, we adopt a prisoner’s dilemma (PD)-
type payoff matrix, wherein users may choose to
cooperate or defect at each interaction and payoffs
follow according to a canonical PD matrix. In the
context of detecting deviant behavior online, the
defector like the deviant user in a social network
aims to influence or take advantage of a coop-
erative user and hence gains greatest benefit by
an interaction with one such user. The cooperative
user, on the other hand, suffers a negative payoff in
this interaction, while the cooperate-cooperate and
defect-defect interactions are more neutral.
We assume that each player observes his own
payoff and strategy at each iteration of the game,
1 In practice, initial strategies may be assigned to each
user randomly, from a distribution of strategies over the entire
population. Or, if available, prior indicators of individual user
behavior may be utilized to provide a better estimate.
as well as the total payoff and the strategy for
each of his neighbors. At each iteration of the
game, a player may choose to change his strategy
by mimicking successful strategies in his neigh-
borhood, proportionally to their relative success.
This play/strategy revision procedure is repeated for
some fixed number of iterations or until conver-
gence (guaranteed, see below). We assume a static
graph in this work, and examine a dynamic graph
in a follow-up study [8].
IV. PRELIMINARIES
Consider our model of behavioral evolution on a
graph G = (V,E) on n nodes. Let A ∈ R2×2 be
a payoff matrix. Following the prisoner’s dilemma
framework, we let
A =
[
a b
c d
]
where c > a > d > 0 > b.
If i ∈ V , let xi(t) ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that
player i will play her first strategy at time (iteration)
t. Thus, the strategy vector for Player i is:
xi =
[
xi
1− xi
]
The payoff to Player i is:
Pi =
∑
j∈N(i)
x
T
i Axj
where N(i) is the neighborhood of i in G. In this
paper, we will consider only two-strategy games;
therefore let x be the vector of xi values. Define:
κij(x) :=
H (Pj(t)− Pi(t)) (Pj(t)− Pi(t))∑
k∈N(i)H (Pk(t)− Pi(t)) (Pk(t)− Pi(t))
(1)
whereH the Heaviside step function (defined as 0 at
0). In the case when Pi(t) = Pj(t) for all j ∈ N(i),
let κij(x) = 0. Note that
∑
j κij(x) = 1, just in
case κij(x) 6= 0 for all j ∈ N(i). Let:
fi(x) =
∑
j∈N(i)
κij(t)(xj(t)− xi(t)) (2)
The strategy update rule is given by
xi(t+ ǫ) = xi(t) + ǫfi(x) (3)
Here: ǫ > 0 and ǫ≪ 1. This rule is a proportional
success mimicking rule in which players will drift
toward (imitate) successful behaviors.
V. CONVERGENCE OF PLAYERS’ STRATEGIES
TO A FINAL STRATEGY VECTOR
We examine the trajectory of individual users’
strategies, assuming no changes in network struc-
ture. The addition or deletion of network ties being
more infrequent than small shifts in individual be-
havior [9], [11], we here capture those behavioral
changes that precede a severing or creation of a
structural tie. We claim that in this case, assuming a
static network structure, there can be stable strategy
equilibria. This holds for all network graphs, and we
show that in the special case of the complete graph
this vector has the form
xf = [x1f , x2f , . . . , xnf ]
where x1f = x2f = . . . = xnf .
A. Equilibrium Points of Player Strategies on an
Arbitrary Network
To study the fixed points of player strategies
under the dynamics of Expression 3 it is easier to
pass to the continuous dynamics:
x˙i = fi(x) =
∑
j∈N(i)
κij(x)(xj − xi) (4)
There are three types of equilibria for the differen-
tial system defined by Equation 4:
Definition 1: A Type 1 Equilibrium occurs when
xi = xj for all i, j. A Type 2 Equilibrium occurs
when Pi(x) = Pj(x) for all i, j and there is at least
one pair i, j so that xi 6= xj . A Type 3 Equilibrium
is any equilibrium not satisfying the conditions of
Types 1 or 2.
Note, a Type 3 equilibria may contain groups
(e.g., cliques) of vertices that all share a strategy
within group but have different strategies among
the groups. It is clear that every system of the
type given by Equation 4 is degenerate in the sense
that it has an infinite number of equilibria. In this
case, it is similar to the SIR dynamics discussed in
[10]. We show that under certain conditions, Type
1 equilibria may be (at worst) neutrally stable. Note
first:
1) if p = i:
∂fi
∂xp
=
∑
j∈N(i)
{
∂κij(x)
∂xp
(xj − xi)− κij(x)
}
(5)
2) if p ∈ N(i):
∂fi
∂xp
=
∑
j∈N(i)
{
∂κij(x)
∂xp
(xj − xi)
}
+κij(x)
(6)
3) Otherwise:
∂fi
∂xp
=
∑
j∈N(i)
∂κij(x)
∂xp
(xj − xi) (7)
We are liberally abusing the derivative operator
here, since κij(x) is clearly not smooth. When we
refer to its derivative we refer to its derivative as
a generalized function with appropriate Dirac delta
distributions used.
Proposition 5.1: If x∗ is an equilibrium point of
Type 1 and
∑
j∈N(i) κij(x
∗) > 0 for at least one i,
then x∗ is at worst neutrally stable.
Proof: We make use of the face that xδ(x) = 0
in the generalized density product, where δ(x) is the
Dirac delta. From our observations and the fact that
xi = xj for all i, j, we have that:
∂fi
∂xp
∣∣∣∣
x=x∗
=


−
∑
j∈N(i) κij(x
∗) if p = i
κij(x
∗) if p ∈ N(i)
0 otherwise
(8)
This implies:
∂fi
∂xp
∣∣∣∣
x=x∗
=


−1 if p = i
κij(x
∗) if p ∈ N(i)
0 otherwise
(9)
Applying the Gershgorin Disk Theorem, we know
that every eigenvalue of the Jacobian lies within
a disk in the complex plane centered at −1 with
radius 1. Thus, the real-parts of these eigenvalues
are non-positive and the resulting fixed point must
be neutrally stable.
Remark 1: It follows from Equation 1, that at
least one row of the Jacobian matrix will contain
all zeros, since there is at least one vertex with
greatest payoff. Thus, at least one eigenvalue must
be identically zero and the resulting Type 1 fixed
points are never asymptotically stable; however they
do exhibit a basin of attraction as we illustrate in
two examples.
Example 1: Consider the randomly generated
graph with 10 vertices in Figure 1 (a). We use the
prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix:
A =
[
3 −7
5 2
]
(10)
Any non-extreme (i.e., not all cooperating or de-
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. (a)A random graph on 10 vertices used to illustrate
the neutral stability of Type 1 fixed points. (b) The weighted
directed imitation graph at the fixed point.
fecting) Type 1 fixed point will suffice for illustrate
the stability properties of these fixed points. Without
loss of generality, will use the x∗i = 0.795 for
i = 1, . . . , 10. If we compute κij(x∗) for each pair,
we can construct the weighted directed imitation
graph, shown in Figure 1 (b). Note, the negative of
the Laplacian for the imitation graph is the Jacobian
matrix of the dynamical system (when we extend
the notion of the Laplacian to weighted directed
graphs). Vertices with 0 out-degree have highest
local payoff and indicate directions in which we
may perturb the equilibria and remain in the basin
of attraction. By way of example, consider the new
point strategy set:
x
′ = [0.79, 0.795, 0.79, 0.8, 0.795, 0.795,
0.792, 0.795, 0.795, 0.7] (11)
Here we have perturbed players 1, 3, 4, 7, and 10
from their equilibrium position, leaving players 2,
5, 6, 8 and 9 at the original equilibrium. Analysis
of the imitation graph suggests the critical players
are 2 and 6, both of whom have 0 out-degree (and
thus zero rows in the Jacobian matrix). The return
to equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2 (a). This
does not mean that the basin of attraction for this
point is a ball. From the the non-equilibrium point:
x
′ = [0.795, 0.795, 0.795, 0.795, 0.795, 0.79,
0.795, 0.795, 0.795, 0.795] (12)
the system converges to a nearby Type 3 equilib-
rium, illustrating the neutral stability of the original
Type 1 point. An interesting element of this example
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. (a) The system is shown returning to equilibrium after
being perturbed. (b) Displacing Player 2 from equilibrium causes
the system to move to a new Type 3 equilibrium.
is Player 10, who becomes significantly more de-
fective is made more cooperative by peer imitation.
Remark 2: Notice the previous results do not
rely on a Prisoner’s dilemma assumption and the
previous proof should generalize to payoff matrices
in Rn×n with appropriate changes made.
Remark 3: Notice this analysis says nothing
about Type 1 equilibria that also satisfy the criteria
of Type 2 equilibria. In this case, the Jacobian
matrix consists of all zeros and thus the imitation
graph has no edges.
Remark 4: Analysis of Type 2 and 3 equilibria is
even less satisfying. In the case of Type 2 equilibria,
we see we are at a point where all derivatives of
fi(x) fail to converge and consequently nothing can
be said about these points, however the stability
is highly questionable. For a Type 3 equilibrium
point satisfying the assumptions of Proposition 5.1,
the Gershgorin disk theorem gives no information
about the convergence other than that these points
may be stable or unstable depending on the nature
of the graph, the point and the payoff matrix. In
practice, we see convergence to Type 3 equilibria in
which vertices can be partitioned into a few strategic
species; i.e., Type 3 equilibria, in practice, look
like the amalgamations of several Type 1 equilibria.
Note, Type 3 equilibria satisfying the definition of
Type 2 equilibria may also have unusual stability
properties.
B. Convergence of Player Strategies in the Com-
plete Case
In the case of the complete graph, we claim
that all players will converge on a single strategy
(Type I), in particular the initial strategy of the most
deviant user in the graph. While the complete graph
has a very strict tie structure and online networks
are generally not complete, this result provides
insight into local behavior in large networks since
their typical small-world structure is highly clus-
tered [30], with densely-linked clusters also tending
to be more homogenous [20].
Theorem 5.2: In the absence of network changes,
the strategies of all players in a completely con-
nected network will converge to a unique value, in
particular to the minimal strategy (least cooperative)
in the initial strategy vector.
Proof: Without loss of generality, let xl =
x1(t0) ≤ x2(t0) ≤ . . . ≤ xn(t0) be the initial
strategies of n completely connected nodes.
The initial payoffs to each are node are ordered
P1(t0) ≥ P2(t0) ≥ . . . ≥ Pn(t0)
since according to our model, in each pairwise
interaction the node less likely to cooperate has a
higher payoff.
Since each player i observes all other players
in the complete graph, he will update his strategy
according to:
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t)+
ǫ ·
∑
j∈J
(Pj(t)− Pi(t))(xj(t)− xi(t))∑
j∈J Pj(t)− Pi(t)
(13)
where J is the set of nodes such that xj(t) < xi(t).
This is a natural modification of Equation 3. Thus
we see that, xi(t + 1) < xi(t) for all xi with the
exception of xl which remains unchanged. Thus we
have
lim
t→∞
xi(t) = xl ∀vi ∈ V. (14)
VI. THE SPREAD OF DEVIANCE ON
BODYBUILDING.COM
In this section, we describe our empirical mea-
surements of the models against a real-world dataset
collected from the web.
A. Data Collection and Measures for Deviance
We collect data from a real-world online bulletin
system, known for the controversial and active
nature of its discussions (BodyBuilding.com, a pop-
ular and longstanding site for body builders and
fans). Bodybuilding.com is powered on a Vbulletin
portal, wherein discussions are grouped by topic,
and each discussion is further given by a collection
of threads. Logged users can create a new thread
and respond to any contributed comment within
a thread. For the purpose of our validation, we
specifically concentrate on a network of users active
on the “Religion/Politics” sub-forum, which collects
several heated discussions on controversial topics.
We build the users’ network by joining users who
have commented on the same thread with an undi-
rected edge, under the assumption that users who
post to a thread have some degree of familiarity
with the other comments posted. This assumption is
supported by the longstanding presence of many of
the community members, who contribute regularly
to the same topics.
We collected a total of 62, 060 posts, over 787
threads, obtaining a network of 2586 distinct nodes
(users) joined by 62, 931 unweighted, undirected
edges.
In order to explore the behavior of users in this
network within the theoretical game framework we
have established, we split the network into two
pieces by time. Particularly, we create an early
network and a late network of user interactions
obtained from the first 31, 030 posts and the second
31, 030 posts, respectively. This allows us to fit our
Fig. 3. Interactions amongst users posting to the ”Reli-
gion/Politics” forum on www.bodybuilding.com.
models in two distinct temporal frames, comparing
the evolution of individual deviant behavior.
Each post is assigned a deviance score in [0, 1],
taken as a weighted average of three measures:
language, sentiment and content relevance. Here
by language, we mean the use of abusive, vulgar
or inflammatory words. To obtain a measure for
each post with respect to this dimension, we extract
distinctive words from the text and compared them
against dictionary of known abusive words, to deter-
mine the ratio of abusive words used. If the result
is above a predefined threshold (e.g. 20% in our
context), we label the comment negative otherwise
it is neutral. To determine the post’s sentiment, we
rely on the AlchemyAPI tool [1]. Alchemy is a text
mining platform with advanced natural language
processing capabilities for semantic analysis. It is
widely used both in academia and industry. In this
regard, it is reasonable to assume a reliable accu-
racy in terms of sentiment classification. Through
Alchemy, the sentiment of each post is marked
as ”positive”, ”negative” or ”neutral” according To
confirm this hypothesis, we additionally validated
sentiment scores using the SentiStrength algorithm
[27], which returned the same sentiment results for
87% of the posts.
Content relevance measures the extent to which
a particular comment is degenerated relative to the
post originating the discussion. It is measured by
considering the mutual information (MI) of the
comment, with respect to the category or topic of
the thread. For a given thread T and a comment
W , it is computed by measuring the the amount
of information each term w in W relates with
the thread T , wherein the relationship strength
(i.e. amount of information) is determined using
the Wordnet dictionary as a reference thesaurus.
The less cohesive the comment is with respect to
the whole thread, the more degenerated or out of
context it is likely to be.
The deviance scores for the subset of users
present in both the early and late networks (586
total) were compared against expected results using
the prisoners dilemma model for the spread of de-
viant behavior in social networks presented above.
The early deviance score for each user was set as the
initial strategy, while the late score was compared
with the final strategy, obtained after running the
PD simulation until convergence (ǫfi(x) ≤ for all
i). This is consistent with sociological evidence that
individuals will settle into behaviors over time and
we have ensured convergence within our model.
B. Empirical Analysis and Observations
Initial work with the data showed that fitting
precise deviance values was impossible (and ill-
conceived, since we were using a computerized
method to determine deviance, which could add
substantial noise to the measured values). Let Y0 be
the early deviance scores and Y be the late deviance
scores and let S be the standard deviation of the
Y0. We binned the elements of Y using S and Y0
so that if Yi ∈ Y0i ±S, then it was assigned Bin 0.
In general if:
Yi ∈ Y0i ± kS and Yi 6∈ Y0i ± (k − 1)S, (15)
then Yi is in bin ±k. For simplicity, we used
five bins, labeled −2 through 2. Letting Yˆ be the
estimated deviance values, we were also able to
compute bin values using the same technique. The
objective was to determine the general ability of
the model to measure an individual’s propensity
to become more or less deviant as a function of
time. The values of the payoff matrix A were fit to
minimize the sum of square bin-error. The best-fit
matrix is given by:
Aˆ =
[
0.1985 −0.6989
0.4927 0.0001
]
(16)
The confusion matrix that results from this model
is given by:
C =


28 11 6 0 0
6 17 47 0 0
7 14 319 42 0
0 1 36 22 0
0 0 16 17 0


Rows are true bins, while columns are expected
bins. From this we can compute the confusion
matrix in probabilities:
P =


0.62222 0.24444 0.13333 0 0
0.085714 0.24286 0.67143 0 0
0.018325 0.036649 0.83508 0.10995 0
0 0.016949 0.61017 0.37288 0
0 0 0.48485 0.51515 0


Figure 4 also summarizes our fit using a histogram.
This matrix is instructive on the capabilities and
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Fig. 4. A histogram showing the true vs. expected distribution
of users into deviance bins.
limitations of the modeling approach. We make the
following observations:
1) The model is very good at estimating when
individuals will remain at approximately the
same deviance level. There is an 83% chance
of correct classification in this case.
2) The model is reasonably good at estimating
when individuals will become much more
deviant (most likely because of the attractive-
ness of the deviant strategy in the prisoner’s
dilemma model).
3) The model tends to under-classify minor
deviance and significantly under-classify in-
dividuals who move toward extreme non-
deviance (i.e., who move to a +2 bin).
What is surprising is the model’s tendency to under-
represent minor shifts toward more deviant behav-
ior, since the prisoner’s dilemma has the strict Nash
equilibrium defect. This suggests that this approach
is promising as a way of modeling the emergence of
more cooperative behaviors within networks. It also
suggests (given the under-representation of minor
deviance) that this game is not the ideal model for
handling deviance. Further research in both these
areas is required.
VII. CONCLUSION
In presenting a general evolutionary game model
for the spread of deviant behavior in social network
graphs, we lay the foundation for an extension of
the general contagion model for influence online to
include the notion of individual payoff. We utilize
a two-strategy prisoner’s dilemma model here, but
alternate models may be more deeply investigated
in future work. Additionally, we assume a single
payoff matrix across all users. Further research
may incorporate multiple payoff matrices where
this information is available or detect users whose
anomalous actions indicate that they are operating
with a different payoff scheme. Validation of this
theoretical framework with a large, online dataset
gives preliminary indication that the model may
indeed work well when tuned within a particular
domain.
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